The Employer as a Necessary Party to Voluntary
Settlement of Work Assignment Disputes
Under Section 10(k) of the NLRA
In PlasterersLocal 79 v. NLRBI1 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit recently reversed a long standing Board practice by
declaring that an employer is not a necessary party to a voluntary adjustment of a jurisdictional dispute under section 10(k) of the National
Labor Relations Act. 2 The Board promptly responded to the decision by
reaffirming its position that employers must be parties to such adjustments.3 Despite the Board's non-acquiescence, the Plasterers decision
introduces an unsettling element into the statutory procedures surrounding jurisdictional disputes.
The NLRA contains a special procedure to deal with disputes between two or more unions or labor groups claiming the right to perform
the same work. Strikes resulting from such "work assignment" or "jurisdictional" controversies are made unfair labor practices by section 8(b)
(4)(D) of the NLRA.4 However, section 10(k) 5 has been interpreted to
1 - F.2d -, 63 CCH Lab. Cas. 10,993, 74 L.R.R.M. 2575 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
2 Section 10(k) provides:
(k) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 8(b), the Board is
empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that
such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute
with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute,
such charge shall be dismissed.
29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
3 Lathers Local 104, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1970).
4 Section 8(b)(4)(D) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in
a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class, unless such
employer is failing to conform to an order q; certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for the employees performing such work.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1964).
5 See note 2 supra.
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require that, prior to any determination of the unfair labor practice
charge, the Board must conduct a hearing6 to determine the merits of
the jurisdictional claim behind the dispute.7 Voluntary compliance with
the Board's award will stay the 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding." Alternatively,
section 10(k) provides that if all the parties agree upon a settlement or
a method of settlement within ten days after notice of the charge is filed
then the 10(k) hearing is obviated and the underlying charge shall be
dismissed. If a union refuses to comply with either a Board determination under section 10(k) or a voluntary settlement within the meaning
of that section, the General Counsel for the NLRB will issue an 8(b)
(4)(D) complaint 9 against the offending labor group. 10
Since the enactment of the statute, the Board has maintained that a
"voluntary adjustment" will preclude further 10(k) proceedings only
where the voluntary procedure includes both the disputing groups and
the employer." Despite the rumblings of a few academics, 12 neither the
Board' 3 nor the federal courts14 had questioned this position until the
Plastererscase.
6 The Board requires that there be. reasonable cause to believe that an 8(b)(4)(D)
violation has occurred before it will conduct a 10(k) hearing. See, e.g., Painters Local 243,
125 N.L.R.B. 136, 140 (1959); Operating Eng'rs Local 450, 115 N.L.R.B. 964, 967 (1956).
5230.03
See also Herzog v. Parsons, 181 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1950); 3 CCH LAB. L. REP.
(1970). Cf. Ship Scaling Contractors Ass'n, 87 N.L.R.B. 92 (1949).
7 In other unfair labor practice cases, an unfair labor practice charge leads directly to
the issuance of a complaint by the General Counsel under § 10(b) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(b) (1964). The complaint is followed by an adversary type proceeding under § 10(c),
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
8 Where voluntary adjustment machinery breaks down, a 10(k) hearing is not a prerequisite for an 8(b)(4)(D) complaint. Lathers Local 2, 119 N.L.R.B. 1345 (1958).
9 29 C.F.R. § 101.36 (1961). See also Lathers Local 2, 119 N.L.R.B. 1345, 1347 (1958).
10 There are other important statutory provisions concerning jurisdictional disputes.
§ 303(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187(a) (1964), makes conduct which would violate
8(b)(4)(D) the basis for a civil suit for damages and costs under 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b)
(1964). § 10(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964), gives the NLRB the power to seek
a temporary restraining order against conduct proscribed by 8(b)(4)(D).
11 Lathers Local 104, 186 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1970). See also Carpenters Local 1622, 139
N.L.R.B. 591, 594 (1962); Operating Eng'rs Local 450, 119 N.L.R.B. 1725, 1730-32 (1958);
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 428, 108 N.L.R.B. 186, 195-98 (1954). In addition see the
other authorities cited in the dissenting opinion of the Plastererscase, 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,188 n.1.
12 O'Donoghue (counsel on the brief for petitioner in Plasterers), jurisdictionalDisputes
in the Construction Industry Since CBS, 52 GEo. L.J. 314, 332 (1964); Sussman, Section
10(k): Mandate for Change? 47 B.U.L. Rav. 201, 209 (1967); cf. Note, Work-Assignment
Disputes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1150, 1156 (1960).
Is See authorities cited note 11 supra.
14 See Operating Eng'rs Local 450 v. Elliot, 256 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir. 1958). In addition
see the other authorities cited in the dissenting opinion of the Plasterers case, 63 CCH
Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,189 n.2. But cf. Penello v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 59, 195 F.
Supp. 458, 466 (D. Del. 1961).
Under the Railway Labor Act the courts have never questioned the employer's right to
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The case involved a dispute between a plasterers union's and a tilesetters union 6 over the right to apply a coat of mortar to walls as a
preliminary step to tiling. Both unions were bound17 to comply with
jurisdictional determinations rendered by the National Joint Board
for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes, 8 an arbitration panel
established by the Building Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. The
employers in the case' 9 had not agreed to accept any such award in lieu
of an NLRB determination under 10(k). The Joint Board heard the
dispute without making the employer a party and awarded the job to
the plasterers. The employers and the tilesetters refused to yield the
work to the plasterers, who thereupon began to picket the job sites. The
employer filed unfair labor practice charges under section 8(b)(4)(D),
which resulted in a 10(k) award in favor of the tilesetters2 ° and a subsequent 8(b)(4)(D) order against the plasterers 21 for refusing to comply
with the NLRB determination. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Board on the ground that the Joint Board award precluded
22
further NLRB proceedings.

be a party to the jurisdictional dispute proceedings before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. See Transportation Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157 (1966). However,
there are strong statutory indications that Congress intended for employers to be parties
to such proceedings under the RLA which are not present in the NLRA. See Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, First (a)(g)(j)(o)(p) (1964).
15 Plasterers Local Union No. 79, Operative Plasterers and Cement Masons International
Association, AFL-CIO.
16 Tile, Terrazzo, and Marble Setters Local Union No. 20, Bricklayers, Masons, and
Plasterers International Union of America, AFL-CIO.
17 All unions affiliated with the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFLCIO, are bound to comply with Joint Board determinations of jurisdictional disputes.
CONsr. OF BUILDING 8- TRADES DEa,'T, AFL-CIO, art. X (1961). See Lathers Local 9, 113
N.L.R.B. 947 (1955). The operation of article X and the organization of the Joint Board
are discussed briefly in Plasterers, 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,181.
18 The Joint Board is discussed in Atleson, The NLRB and JurisdictionalDisputes: The
Aftermath of CBS, 53 GEo. L.J. 93, 130 (1964); O'Donoghue, supra note 12, at 329; Rains,
Jurisdictional-DisputeSettlements in the Building Trades, 8 LAB. LJ. 385, 390-94 (1957);
Sussman, supra note 12, at 225.
19 The dispute submitted to the Joint Board involved a controversy at a job site where
Southwestern Construction Co. was the general contractor and Texas State Tile and
Terrazzo, Inc., was the subcontractor in charge of the disputed work. The 8(b)(4)(D) charge
also included picketing at another job site where the work was under Martini Tile and
Terrazzo Co.
20 167 N.L.R.B. 185 (1967).
21 172 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1968).
22 Although the Plasterers decision purported to deal only with the employer's right to
be a party to voluntary adjustment decisions, the opinion has important ramifications
with regard to the right of employers to be heard in 10(k) hearings. Presumably, if an
employer is not a necessary party to a voluntary adjustment, then he likewise is not a
necessary party in an NLRB proceeding. However, the majority opinion suggests that this
result may be avoided by distinguishing "parties to the dispute" (the unions), which are
necessary for voluntary adjustment, from "parties to the 10(k) proceeding" (presumably
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The court's decision seems to rest on two somewhat overlapping
bases, both of which involve the question of congressional intent. On
the one hand, the court suggested that Congress specifically did not
intend employers to be parties to 10(k) proceedings; consequently, the
Joint Board determination satisfied the requirements of 10(k) since
the only rightful parties to a 10(k) hearing, the unions, were also parties
to the voluntary determination. The court's other line of reasoning
looked to a more generalized intent. The majority held that 10(k)
procedures were designed solely to protect "neutral employers," whose
only valid interest is the swift resolution of the dispute rather than the
merits of the controversy. The court indicated that the Joint Board
23
decision protected this interest as well as did NLRB proceedings.
This comment will examine these arguments and the premises, legislative history, and policy considerations upon which they were based.
I.

NARRow INTENT: WAS THE EMPLOYER INTENDED TO BE A PARTY?

The majority opinion in Plasterersasserted that Congress specifically
did not intend that the employer be a necessary party to 10(k) proceedings or to voluntary adjustments under that section.2 4 The court ascertained this intent from two sources-the legislative history and the
wording of the Act.
The relevant legislative history contains two types of references which

the court found persuasive. First, there are "definitional" remarks which
describe a jurisdictional dispute as a controversy between two or more
unions. 25 However, such remarks merely reflect the truism that a jurisdictional dispute has as its essence interunion controversy. These axiomatic observations certainly do not compel the inference that Congress
intended that the employer not be heard on the merits of the dispute.

A second type of commentary surrounding 10(k) suggests that a
primary purpose of the section was to encourage the development of
private interunion machinery to resolve work assignment controversies. 2 6 Senator Morse cited the practice of the War Labor Board
the employer and the unions). 63 CCH Lab. Cas.

10,993, at 19,182. The court cites no

authority for this distinction and there is no support for it in either the statute or the
legislative history.
23 Id. at 19,187-88. It is significant to note that the Joint Board determination had not
resulted in a resolution of the dispute because the tilesetters had refused to comply with
the determination.
24 Id. at 19,182.
25 93 CONG. REc. 1890 (1947), II NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HIsroRY OF THE LABOR MANAGE&ENT RELATIONs AcT, 1947, 951 (1948) [hereinafter cited as IEG. HIsT.] (remarks of
Senator Morse); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947), I LEG. Hisr. 561 (1947),
cited by the court, 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
26

93

CONG.

10,993, at 19,184.

REc. 1911 (1947), II LEG. HsT. 983 (remarks of Senator Morse), cited by the
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during World War II for its effectiveness in encouraging interunion
agreement:
[W]e would give the union leaders involved in a jurisdictional
dispute 24 hours to proceed to settle the dispute without a
work stoppage, and upon their failure to do so we would appoint an arbitrator whose decision would be final and binding.
What I wish to stress is the remarkable compliance we obtained so far as the quick settlement of jurisdictional disputes
was concerned ....27

The War Labor Board practice was cited primarily as an example of
the efficacy of a statutory incentive to voluntary settlement; there was
no express consideration of the employer's role in jurisdictional disputes
under either the wartime emergency practice or the proposed legislation.
It is certainly consistent to have the objective of encouraging interunion settlements while at the same time intending that no such settlement exclude the employer. Commentators tend to support the court's
position as to what Congress would have done had it faced the issue
squarely. 28 But the more accurate view would seem to be that, as expressed in the Plasterersdissent, "the members of Congress just did not
address themselves to the point." 29
Similar criticisms can be leveled at one of the court's efforts to divine
congressional intent from the wording of 10(k). The majority relied
heavily on the failure of Congress to name the employer as a necessary
party to a 10(k) proceeding:
Congress could have written §10(k) so that the employer
would be a necessary party to a procedure for voluntary settlement by requiring agreement on such a procedure by both the
parties to the unfair labor practice charge and the parties to
the underlying dispute out of which that charge arises. 80
But Congress also could have written the section so as to limit the
necessary parties specifically to the rival labor groups involved. Instead,
court, 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,184-85. See also S. (MIN.) REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess. pt. 2, at 18-19 (1947), I LEG. HIsT. 480-81; 93 CONG. REG. 6610 (1947), 1I LEG. HIsT.
1554-55.
27 93 CONG. REc. 1910-11 (1947), II LEro. HIsT. 983, cited in Sussman, supra note 12, at
210-11. The first paragraph is quoted in the Plasterers opinion. 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,184. See also U.S. NAT'L WAR LABOR BOARD (1942-45), TERMINATION
REPORT vol. I, at 71-80 (1945); S. PODOLsKY, GumE To WAR LABOR BOARD PoLIcY 2 (2d ed.

1945).
28 See authorities cited note 12 supra.
29 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,190 (MacKinnon, C.J., dissenting).
so Id. at 19,182.
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the legislative process produced a more ambiguous statute, which arguably is subject to either interpretation.
The court's second statutory construction argument is not as easily
dismissed. The court noted a lack of mutuality in the NLRB interpretation of the statute.3 1 Although 10(k) penalizes the losing union by
subjecting it to 8(b)(4)(D) charges if it strikes instead of complying with
the Board award, no similar sanction exists against the employer who
chooses to disregard the 10(k) decision.32 The court concluded that
"[t]he fact that the employer is not bound by a 10(k) determination of
the Board is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend a voluntary procedure for adjustment to be held inadequate because the em'33
ployer is not bound [by the result of the voluntary adjustment].
However, the lack of mutuality which the court perceived is more
apparent than real. The legal effect of a 10(k) award on the unions is
very limited. Although they are precluded from raising the specific
defense of right to the work in question, the unions still may be
exonerated of 8(b)(4)(D) charges. While the Board award cannot be
challenged in an unfair labor practice hearing, 4 the findings and conclusions in a 10(k) proceeding are not res judicata in the later 8(b)(4)(D)
determination 5 as far as the existence of an unfair labor practice is
concerned. Both parties can put in new evidence at the 8(b)(4)(D)
stage;3 6 and, the two proceedings have different standards of proof. "In
a section 10(k) proceeding the Board need find only that there is
reasonable cause to believe that an 8(b)(4)(D) violation has occurred; 37
31 Id. at 19,188, 19,182.
32 The employer is not required to give the work in question to the group that wins

the 10(k) award, but if that union strikes the employer to enforce the award, then the
employer cannot obtain relief under 8(b)(4)(D).
It has been questioned whether a union winning an award under 10(k) could be held
liable under 303. See Note, Work-Assignment Disputes Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 73 HAiv. L. REv. 1150, 1160 (1960). A Board determination under 10(k) or 8(b)(4)(D)
is not a condition precedent for a 303 action. Longshoremen v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237 (1952); Public Constructors, Inc. v. Local 400, IBEW, 55 CCH Lab. Cas.
11,883
(D.N.J. 1967). The 303 trial is usually before a jury; Board determinations are not given
res judicata effect. Taube Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Local 349, IBEW, 261 F. Supp. 664, 665
(S.D. Fla. 1966).
Conceivably an employer's noncompliance could be the basis for an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer under 8(a)(1), (2), (3), or (5), but the Board has never
considered such noncompliance to violate these sections.
33 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,182.
34 Cleveland Stereotypers Local 22, 160 N.L.R.B. 1184, 1186 (1966); Local 1291, ILA,
142 N.L.R.B. 257 (1963).
35 International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B. 759, 761 (1959).
36 However, the evidence is often limited by stipulation to the record in the 10(k)
proceeding. Compare Cleveland Stereotypers Local 22, 160 N.L.R.B. 1184, 1185 (1966), with
International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B 759, 761 (1959).
37 See note 6 supra.
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in an 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding findings are based on a preponderance of
the evidence."38 Therefore, conceivably, the losing union in a 10(k)
proceeding could win at the 8(b)(4)(D) stage.
Admittedly it is very likely that continued union pressure in noncompliance with a 10(k) award will result in an 8(b)(4)(D) order where
the union cannot claim the right to the work in question as a defense.
However, the argument that the union is not bound by the 10(k)
award is no more artificial and unrealistic than the court's argument
that the employer is not bound. Although the employer has no direct
legal obligation to comply with the 10(k) determination, his failure to
award the work in question to the winning union has a very significant
pragmatic effect. It allows the union to strike the employer to enforce
the award without being prosecuted for 8(b)(4)(D) violations. The
strike weapon can be unleashed immediately and its effect is often
devastating. In one sense, therefore, the employer is legally affected by
the award: he is deprived of the protection of 8(b)(4)(D).
The cost of the strike weapon in jurisdictional disputes is indicated
by the fact that in 1968, 379 work assignment strikes involving 43,900
workers cost employers 258,300 man-days of work.3 9 This figure does
not begin to cover the secondary costs resulting from the refusal of other
employees, customers, carriers, and other vital groups to cross picket
lines.
Thus, the lack of mutuality in the Act can be viewed as a significant
indicator of congressional intent to exclude employers as parties only
if it is assumed that Congress shared the court's disregard of the practical realities of economic warfare. It is at least equally plausible that
Congress did recognize the realities of the situation and bound the
unions in order to equalize the coercive power between unions and
employers. Under this view, any lack of mutuality in the statute is
indicative of congressional concern for the interests of the employer
caught in a cross-fire between unions. Such concern seems incompatible
with an intent to exclude the employer from the one place where he
can best protect his substantive interests-the 10(k) proceedings.
In short, the evidence is not convincing that Congress intended to
exclude the employer as a party to a 10(k) proceeding. Since for all
practical purposes the battle is won or lost at the 10(k) stage, employers
as well as unions should be parties to such hearings, provided that they
have valid interests to protect. The ultimate question then is whether
38 International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B. 759, 761 n_5 (1959).
39 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1646,

ANALYSIS

OF

ToWK STOPPAGES, 1968, Table 5 (1970). The preliminary report for 1969 indicates even
higher costs for that year. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, SUMMARY

REPORT, WORK STOPPAGES IN 1969, Table 4 (1970).
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the employer has valid interests which are protected by a 10(k) hearing
but not by a Joint Board determination.
II.

GENERAL INTENT:

DOES THE EMPLOYER NEED TO BE A PARTY?

The decision in Plasterersrelied heavily on the assumption that Con40
gress intended section 10(k) to benefit only "neutral" employers.
Under this view the employer has no legitimate interest in the substance of the award; instead, his only cognizable concern is the swift
resolution of the dispute. If the employer has no interest in the determination, then he does not need to be a party to the voluntary or statutory
proceedings involved.
The court recognized that the literal language of the statute contains
no requirement of employer neutrality:
The Taft-Hartley Act, though broad and unqualified in its
terms, must be taken in light of its dominant purpose to pro41
tect "neutral" employers.
The "dominant purpose" of sections 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) was established to the court's satisfaction 42 by a sentence in the Supreme Court
48
case of NLRB v. Radio Engineers Local 1212 (CBS):
[A]nd the House Committee report on one of the proposals
out of which these sections came recognized the necessity
of enacting legislation to protect employers from being "the
'44
helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all.
The fact that Congress intended to protect neutral employers does
not require the inference that only neutral employers were considered
worthy of protection. Indeed, other portions of the brief legislative history on this question suggest that all jurisdictional strikes were to be
covered by 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k), 45 and that the dominant purpose of the
statute was the "elimination of the obstructions to the free flow of com40 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,187-88.
41 Id. at 19,187.
42 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,183. But see the interpretation of this language in
the Plasterers dissent, id. at 19,189.
43 864 U.S. 573, 580-81 (1961).
44 H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1947), I LEG. Hisr. 314. The quote is
taken somewhat out of context. The full sentence reads:
More often than not the employers are powerless to comply with the demands
giving rise to the activities, and many times they and their employees as well are
the helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all.
The report went on to say that jurisdictional strikes were made unlawful under the
proposed legislation. There was no indication of an intention to limit the provision to
neutral employer situations.
45 98 CoNG. Rac. 4155 (1947), II Lrn. HIST. 1046 (remarks by Senator Murray).
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merce" 46 and the preservation of industrial peace by affording quick
relief from jurisdictional pickets. 47 Aside from one unexplained refer-

ence by Senator Morse to employer "collusion," 48 the legislative history
is completely void of any congressional indication that neutrality was
intended to be a prerequisite for 10(k) standing.
The court also makes reference to the executive suggestions in
President Truman's 1947 State of the Union Message 49 as an indication
of the objectives of Congress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act. 50 In a
much cited phrase, Truman referred to the public and employers as
"innocent bystanders who are injured by a collision between rival
unions."51 He then went on to condemn all jurisdictional strikes in no
uncertain terms:
I consider jurisdictional strikes indefensible.
...

When rival unions are unable to settle such disputes

themselves, provision must be made for peaceful and binding
52
determination of the issues.
Both the court decision and the Board practice provide a machinery for
"peaceful and binding resolution of the issues." President Truman's
remarks can provide a makeweight for either position depending on
whether emphasis is placed on the word "innocent" or on the word "indefensible." If innocence connotes neutrality53 and was intended to be
a prerequisite for relief, then perhaps Truman sought to proscribe only
jurisdictional strikes against neutral employers. If all jurisdictional
strikes are indefensible, then all disputes presumably were the target of
the President's message. Probably both words were chosen for their
emotive value rather than for an accurate description of the proposed
legislative objective. The lack of significant legislative or executive com46 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1947), I .EG. Hi'. 414.
47 Id. at 27, I LEG. HiST. at 433.
48 Senator Morse: "Does the Senator agree with me also, that the time has come
when the public interest has a right to demand, in the absence of collusion on the part of
the employer, that labor desist from economic action in jurisdictional disputes?" 93 CONG.
Rrc. 4256 (1947), 11 LEG. HusT. 1057.
49 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,183 n.14.
50 The weight to be accorded to this type of evidence of congressional intent may be
questioned in view of the fact that the Taft-Hartley Act passed over President Truman's
veto. However, the veto message makes no reference to the jurisdictional dispute provisions
of the Act. See 93 CoNG. REc. 7485-88 (1947).
51 Id. at 136.
52 Ad.

53 The most unscrupulous and most anti-union employer would be neutral in a jurisdictional dispute so long as he apportioned his malice evenly. Likewise it is difficult to
characterize a legitimately interested employer as "guilty" of anything simply because he
shows a preference as to what group performs certain parts of his business operation.
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ment on the neutrality issue makes it difficult to escape the conclusion
that that problem was never really considered in the 10(k) context.
However, the court's position on employer neutrality did not rest
solely on its view of the legislative history. The court also relied on the
"Safeway doctrine" 54 to support its views.5 5 In Safeway the NLRB held
that an employer could not bring an 8(b)(4)(D) action and obtain a
10(k) determination where the unions involved had voluntarily agreed
which one would receive the job, that is, where there is ho "real competition between unions or groups of employees for the work"56 and the
only actual dispute is between the employer and one union.
The court in Plasterers equated the situation where only one union
claims a job with a case where two unions are bound to abide by a certain type of determination, saying that in both cases there is actual
agreement between the two unions. 57 Since the non-neutral employer
does not receive the benefit of a 10(k) proceeding in the former case, the
court decided that he should not receive it in the latter.
The court's extension of Safeway represents an extraordinary departure from the consistent attempts of the NLRB and the federal courts
to narrow the doctrine. 58 On policy grounds, Plasterershardly presents
a propitious moment to break with precedent. Obviously the court is
correct in perceiving the employer's interest to be as strong in a "Safeway" situation, where one union is persuaded to disclaim the work, as
in a "Plasterers" type controversy. The important distinction between
the two cases is that in the former situation the parties are placed in
what is in essence a collective bargaining position. To allow the Board
54 See Teamsters Local 107 (Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961). See also
cases cited in the majority opinion in Plasterers,63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,187.
55 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,187.
56 134 N.L.R.B. at 1323.
57 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,187.
58 Although the Safeway doctrine has never been overruled, the NLRB and the federal
courts have interpreted the rule of that case very narrowly. One court refused to find a
disclaimer where the inside union honored the outside union's picket line. Construction
Employers Ass'n v. Operating Eng'rs Local 450, 427 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1970). The
Board has questioned a representative's authority to disclaim work. Millwrights Local
1113, 157 N.L.R.B. 996, 1002 (1966). Explicit disclaimers have been ignored or held nondispositive where the work in question was covered by a contract between the disclaiming
union and the employer, Local 1291, ILA, 152 N.L.R.B. 676 (1965), enforced, 368 F.2d 107
(3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1033 (1967); Bricklayers Local 2, 152 N.L.R.B. 278,
282 (1965), or where the disclaiming union accepted pay for the work, Carpenters Local
1849 v. C.J. Montag & Sons, Inc., 335 F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Construction
Employers Ass'n v. Operating Eng'rs Local 450, supra, at 234; Local 1291, ILA, supra,
at 110, or where the disclaiming employees have continued to do the work after the
disclaimer, Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 525, 173 N.L.R.B. No. 208 (1968); see also
Millwrights Local 1113, supra; Local 1291, ILA, supra, at 679-80. In sum, the NLRB and
the federal courts have been quick to find the polarity necessary to present a "jurisdictional
dispute."
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to hear a case within the Safeway doctrine would involve substantive interference with the bargaining process-an interference which is completely antithetical to the basic objectives of the NLRA.5 9 Yet, these
reasons for restricting the availability of 10(k) are totally absent in
Plasterers,where a real controversy between unions existed. In short,
the court has stood the Safeway doctrine on its head. It has used a theory
which starts from the premise that no real controversy exists60 to support
a procedure which has an end result of eliminating the real controversy.
Upon this weak foundation of legislative history and precedent, the
court concluded that giving preclusive effect to Joint Board determinations held without the employer best served the underlying policies of
the Act. On the one hand, the Board through its injunctive power under
section 10(l) could fully protect the neutral employer from labor strife
until the Joint Board made its award;61 on the other hand, the court's
holding would contribute to industrial peace by encouraging interunion settlements, since, contrary to the Board procedure, the losing
union would be denied a "legal right to another bite at the apple in
the 10(k) proceeding." 62 In this respect the court said that its result was
buttressed by the strong federal labor policy in favor of arbitration. 63
The real question is not whether the losing union should have an
extra bite at the apple, but whether the first bite was ingestible; not
whether arbitration is desirable, but who should be a party to the
arbitration. If industrial peace were the only value to be protected, the
legislature could conceivably obtain a zero level of disruption simply by
prohibiting all challenges to employer awards. Thus, the argument
comes full circle. The court uses its initial premise-that 10(k) was
intended solely for neutral employers whose only legitimate concern is
with the resolution of work assignment controversies, as opposed to the
merits of the underlying claims-as a reason for its result-a procedure
which provides for quick and final resolution of the dispute. The basic
issue remains unresolved: should protection of the statute be reserved
for neutral employers?
There are strong reasons against reading a neutrality requirement
into the statute. As a practical matter, few employers are totally unconcerned with what group of employees performs the various jobs involved
59 See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 US. 99 (1970); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952).
60 The Safeway doctrine has been used by the Board only to establish whether a
jurisdictional dispute in fact exists. See, e.g., Carpet, Linoleum & Soft Tile Layers Local
1905, 143 N.L.R.B. 251, 255-56 (1963); Lathers Local 328, 139 N.L.R.B. 598 (1962); Sheetmetal Workers Local 272, 136 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).

61 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964).
62
63

63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,186.
Id. at 19,191, citing Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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in their business operations. Although employer partiality can be
spawned by illicit considerations such as racial bias,6 4 the desire to avoid
dealing with the proper bargaining representative of his employees, 65 or
the desire to utilize a company dominated union, 66 legitimate criteria
concerning the quality and efficiency of production, wage costs, and the
stability of labor relations are more common sources of employer
preference.
Consider as a blatant example the plight of a manufacturer struck by
plumbers desiring work in precision tool making presently assigned to
tool and die makers, or a painting contractor besieged by masons wanting jobs as painters. An employer in such a situation may be more in
need of statutory protection than a completely neutral employer because he is equally hard hit by the jurisdictional strike and has more to
lose by capitulation.
In practice the merits of the competing groups are rarely so disparate.
However, even between well qualified competitors the employer's interests are significant. For example, assume that routine electrical maintenance work is claimed by both the electricians union and the maintenance workers union. An employer faced with this choice could
legitimately prefer either union. The electricians are presumably more
skilled and therefore more expensive, but their labor may be superior
even on routine jobs. If the employer currently has some employees
represented by each union in his plant, he may wish to give the work
to the less busy group or the group closest to the work in order to avoid
overtime, wasted hours, or interruption of the general flow of specific
operations. He may be concerned about the mix of skills in his plant
or on a particular shift, especially where a large volume of skilled or unskilled work is expected at a later date, or where there is a general
scarcity of certain skills in the labor market. Assignment to one union
may involve layoffs with corresponding unemployment benefit payments and office administrative costs. Eliminating the jobs of senior
employees in high labor grades can involve collateral costs under contracts which give laid-off employees a right to displace lesser paid junior
employees in lower labor grades. Furthermore, the award can have
severe repercussions on labor-management relations. One union may
be easier to deal with or more reliable; 67 or, increasing the jobs done by
one bargaining unit may complicate collective bargaining.
64 The use of racial considerations in employment practices is proscribed by Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to § 2000e-15 (1964).
65 A duty to bargain with representatives of his employees is placed on the employer
by §§ 8(a)(1), (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (5) (1964).

66 An employer's domination of or interference with any labor organization of his employees is prohibited by §§ 8a(1), (2) of the NLRA, 29 US.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (2) (1964).
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In sum, any change in present job allocation may involve considerable
costs. It is significant to note in this respect that the great majority of
jurisdictional disputes occur in the construction industry,68 which is
characterized by closely figured bids with narrow profit margins.6 9 These
margins can quickly be turned into deficits where forced work assignment changes involve any of the aforementioned costs. In fact, it could
be argued that to inflict these substantial costs without allowing the
employer to be heard is a denial of the employer's constitutional right
70
to due process.
The Joint Board is hardly an ideal forum in which to advance these
important employer interests. Although it is composed of both union
and employer representatives, 71 its decisions tend to reflect purely union
interests. In structuring its awards to best serve the interests of the
constituent members of the Building Trades Department, the Joint
Board gives controlling weight to prior Joint Board decisions of record
and interunion agreements of record.7 2 In the absence of such decisions
67 Discrimination on the basis of union membership is made an unfair labor practice
by § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
68

See generally K. STRAND, JURISDICTIONAL
Ta NLRB (1961).
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69 See note 77 infra.
70 The constitutional argument is that deciding an employer's substantive rights at a
proceeding to which he is not a party is a denial of the employer's right to due process.
Clearly a Joint Board decision which legally bound the employer would violate due
process if the employer had not been made a party to the proceeding. See Shields v. Utah
Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S. 177, 182 (1938); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 56 (9th Cir.
1970). The fact that the decision has very strong practical, if not legal, effects might
bring the employer within these cases. Cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 88
F. Supp. 658, 663 (S.D. Tex. 1950). Authority in the labor law area is sparse. Cf. NLRB v.
Mackay Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938). But cf. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. NLRB, 202
F.2d 546, 549 (3d Cir. 1953) (suggesting that the right of a charging party to a hearing
may arise only after the NLRB issues a complaint).
A second possible constitutional problem involves delegation of governmental power. It
is arguable that where a private board is allowed to render a final decree which precludes
further administrative adjudication the effect is an unconstitutional delegation of power
to a private body. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137,
144 (1912). Cf. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 854 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). But
see St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 287 (1908); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC,
198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 855 (1952); 1 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 2.14 (1958). The indirectness of the delegation plus the fact that the
nondelegation doctrine is very much out of fashion as a constitutional principle, see
generally id. § 2, suggest that this constitutional challenge would fail.
71 BUILDING

& CONsTR. TRADEs

DEP'T,

AFL-CIO,

PLAN

FOR SETruNG JURIsDICTIONAL

DISPUTES NATIONALLY AND LOcALLY art. II, at 1 (April 1970). The presence of employer
representatives on the Joint Board seems inconsistent with the premise of employer
neutrality. See Plasterers, 63 CCH Lab. Cas.
10,993, at 19,191 (MacKinnon, CJ., dissenting).
72 PROCEDURAL RULES AND REGULATIONS or THE NATIONAL JOINT BoARD Foz SarrLExENT
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or agreements the award is determined by the established trade practice 73 or the prevailing area practice.7 4 Obviously these criteria have
little appeal to an employer whose work assignment is based on other
considerations.
While Plasterers offers no real check on the authority of the Joint
Board over important employer interests, the court appears to have
hedged on its neutrality position somewhat by suggesting in a footnote
that the decision might not apply in a case where the voluntary adjustment proceeding failed to make "realistic provision for meaningful attention to the interest of the employer, and to questions of efficiency." 75
However, in the text to which the footnote refers, the opinion declares
that the employer's interests are completely protected by speedy resolution of the controversy. Therefore, even if the court were willing to review the merits of such arbitration awards, it could not consistently
deny preclusive effect to any voluntary adjustment proceedings that
resulted in a final resolution of the dispute.
The NLRB provides a more sympathetic forum. In fact the great
majority of 10(k) awards affirm the employer's assignment,76 thereby
protecting the employer's interests.
In essence, then, any judgment as to the wisdom of the court's position regarding the NLRB policy must depend ultimately on whether
union or employer interests are in greater need of protection. It could
be argued that in the main industry in which the Joint Boards operate,
the construction industry, the employers are the group to be favored.
The employers are mostly small, marginal operators whose bargaining
power relative to the unions is quite weak 7 As previously mentioned,
changes in work assignment may spell the difference between profit and
loss for these employers. Aside from the economic interests of the employers, a factor to be considered is the nature of the industry itself. In
recent years the construction industry has been characterized by rapidly
rising costs and low or nonexistent gains in productivity.7 8 A major reaOF JURISDICTIONAL DIsPuTES, PROCEDURES USED BY THE JOINT BOARD (B)(7)(a)

(1949,

as

amended 1965).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 63 CCH Lab. Cas.

10,993, at 19,187 n.27.
76 See B. MELTZER, LABOR LAw: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 547 (1970); O'Donoghue,
supra note 12; Sussman, supra note 12. ABA LABOR RmATIONS SECrION, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF THE SrEcw.. "10(K)" COMMITTEE 437, 438 (1964).
77 See The Wages of Building Zoom, BUSINESMS
WEEK, July 19, 1969, at 89-90; O'Hanlon,
The Unchecked Power of the Building Trades, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 102.
78 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMER E, BUSINESS STATISTCS 78 (1969 ed.) (costs); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, SURvEY OF CURRENT BUSmss S-15 (Nov. 1970) (costs); O'Hanlon, supra note 77,

at 89-90. Givens, Job Security in the Building Industry-and High Quality Low-Rent
Housing, 18 LAB. L.J. 468 (1967).
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son for the increased costs and the failure to introduce technological innovations has been the power of the building trades unions.7 9 In light
of these considerations, one may question whether the Plastererscourt
was wise to break with long established practice in jurisdictional disputes, since the inevitable result is a further strengthening of the building trades unions.
79

Givens, supra note 78; OHanlon, supra note 77, at 103, 104, 209, 214.

